Blog Ekkehard Friebe

Ich nehme Bezug auf meinen Blog-Eintrag: Nikolai Rudakov: „Establishment”. Aus dem dort genannten Buch (1981): „Fiction stranger than truth – In the metaphysical labyrinth of relativity” von Nikolai Rudakov bringe ich nachstehend eine weitere Leseprobe:

Zitat:

4 Fundamental Principles

The foundations of physics include a number of unanalysable concepts, axiomatic premises and ultimate principles which are essentially metaphysical. These rational elements form a framework of assumptions which serves äs an indispensable ordering and linking pattern for the unprocessed and disconnected pieces of information acquired by studying nature. Newton’s mechanics, the core of classical physics, is based on a set of partly explicit, partly implied and partly hidden assumptions, and so is Einstein’s relativity theory. The presence of metaphysical elements äs such in the foundations of physics is not a problem. Philosophical ingredients enter into the composition of fundamental ideas practically in all branches of science. The predicament lies in the fact that Newton’s and Einstein’s assumptions differ. Some scholars assert that Einstein has provided the principles for a new and completely non-Newtonian mechanics. Irrespective of whether this is the case or not, we are faced with serious discrepancies and have to decide which of the two alternatives is valid.

Of course, the „canons“ or fundamental principles themselves are, or ought to be, derived from nature. However, such rational elements are not immediately given and are not obtained in the same way äs the results of direct observation, measurement and experiment. They have to be abstracted from an extensive range of physical phenomena which have been subjected to a process of interpretation, generalisation and other refinement. Furthermore, abstraction requires a substantial purely mental contribution. An active participation of the mind is necessary to formulate the conceptual content of a principle, and reason as well as imagination influence the shape of the end product. Consequently, fundamental principles are epistemologically quite different from the initial empirical building stones of physics. Their validity is more open to doubt. They contain philosophical elements which cannot be proved or verified in the same way as the initial physical facts, and they can, therefore, only be considered as plausible assumptions or presuppositions which may be substantially right, but may also be in need of improvement or amendment. However, without a set of such assumptions the pursuit of physics would not be possible.

There is no generally accepted way of identifying, differentiating and grouping assumptions, even those which have been explicitly stated, discussed and accepted by philosophers and physicists. The situation is aggravated by the fact that some assumptions are considered as implied by others, some have never been sufficiently clearly elaborated, some are unstated but commonly understood and some may still be completely hidden. We will distinguish four fundamental principles of physics, or „ensembles“ of fundamental propositions, under the following titles: (a) reality, (b) uniformity, (c) causality, and (d) dimensionality.

The first and most elementary metaphysical principle of Newtonian physics is that there exists an external reality which is called the physical world or nature. Although we derive our knowledge of it through the senses, the physical world is nevertheless independent of any human mind. This assumption is supported by the far-reaching coincidence in the description of sense data by any given number of observers. The fact that we can arrive at a consensus as to what we individually perceive so easily and naturally compels us to believe in the existence of an objective world. The purpose of physics is to study and describe this objective world profoundly and systematically. The belief in the external reality implies that this reality is comprehensible and describable, and that it can be re-created by the human mind. The aggregate weight of agreement among physicists completely dwarfs any disagreement. Thus, the justification of the realist point of view is embodied not only in the consensus achieved by physicists in the process of studying nature, but also in the highly sophisticated arid yet uniform body of knowledge resulting from their efforts, and particularly in its usefulness and reliability. The principle of external reality is, of course, closely associated with one of the central problems of philosophy. The Newtonian viewpoint in the ideological spectrum is that of a moderate realist who accepts the totality of external being and sees himself as a part of it, and who subordinates epistemological considerations to the ontology which is uncovered primarily through the detailed study of the physical world, but who does not wish to become embroiled in complex and purely theoretical questions of philosophy.

In the Einsteinian metaphysics the first elementary principle is already and considerably modified. The existence of the physical world is admitted, but at the same time a shadow is cast on its reality and comprehensibility. Einstein’s view is as follows: The belief in an external world independent of the perceiving subject is the basis of all natural science. Since, however, sense perception gives Information of this external world or of „physical reality“ indirectly, we can only grasp the latter by speculative means.

(Zitatende)

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Beste Grüße Ekkehard Friebe