Blog Ekkehard Friebe

Ich bringe  jetzt einen weiteren Beitrag von Mogens True Wegener (Dänemark): 
Quelle: RELATIVITY & COSMOLOGY 
Kommentar:
“These papers contain the reflections of a Danish philosopher of science on basic issues of physics. They represent the British Tradition in relativity and relativistic cosmology as opposed to that of Einstein.”

Zitat: 
IDEAS OF COSMOLOGY – A PHILOSOPHER’S SYNTHESIS
Revised version (2010) of paper printed in: Duffy & Wegener, eds.: ‚Recent Advances in Relativity Theory‘, vol.1, Hadronic Press 2000 (ISBN 1-57485-047-4)
Mogens True Wegener, emeritus professor of philosophy, Aarhus University, Danmark 

CONTENTS
1. Cosmology, a Science?
2. Milne’s ‚Kinematic‘ Relativity
3. Walker’s Analysis of Milne’s Ideas
4. Revolt Against Prejudice in Science!
5. Theories of Continued Creation
6. A Program for Synthesis

1. COSMOLOGY, A SCIENCE?

All science is cosmology!  
Sir Karl Popper (1958)

In our time, Cosmology is generally acknowledged to be the science of the universe. But what is the universe? Is it being, entity, or substance? Is it nature itself, ultimate reality? How do we overcome the desperate difficulties of speaking sensibly of everything at once? And in what sense can such an elusive subject be the object of anything like a real science? Can we avoid the danger of assuming either too little or too much even before we begin? Finally, the universe is one, or unique: how can it then give rise to a legitimate science at all? Such questions cry for their rational answers but, of course, it is easier to ask than to reply. Hoping for better progress later, we shall start by making our language a bit more precise.

Neglecting the traditional mythological and metaphysical implications of cosmology which are better left to the humanities for investigation, we prefer to concentrate on those senses of the term ‚universe‘ which are more often brought up in relation to modern science; we shall therefore primarily use the term in the plural, to betoken scientific world-models. Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that we all, for the purpose of preserving our lives in spite of an often hostile world, develop for ourselves what we might call: a practical metaphysics. We thus mostly accept that humans are mortal beings, that nature appear to be governed by general laws and, hence, that what happens may be explained as the effects of natural causes.  So we feel reasonably convinced that if we venture to jump into a vulcano (some like it hot!) we shall hardly avoid to burn up, and that if we kick a stone we shall probably hurt our foot. Thus we are tempted to assume the existence of a unique ordered entity: The Universe.

Now, do such reasons entitle us to claim that there is an Ultimate Material Reality, that the Universe must possess a definite Formal Structure, that the Course of Nature must be ruled by Law, and that the Principle relating Cause and Effect is valid without exception? This question is not an issue of science, not even of common sense, but of philosophy, and to answer it in the affirmative would presuppose that our own practical metaphysics which is private, or particular, does in fact entail a theoretical metaphysics which is public, or universal. For people with an innate distaste for ontology this consequence may seem rather appalling: obeying some rules of behaviour clearly differs from adopting their casual conceptualization. Without committing myself to the entire critical philosophy of Kant, I must admit that his famous distinction between reality-for-us and reality-in-itself seems to be of relevance here, practical metaphysics relating to the first, and theoretical metaphysics treating of the latter. Armed with this distinction we are able to separate a practical metaphysics which is useful, even unavoidable, from a theoretical ontology which is redundant, and often odious.

But are we not, for the purposes of science, in need of a very abstract and general notion of the universe, one which might serve as an ultimate instance of reference and whose function it is to promote the final unification of the disparate elements of human experience? It seems that we are, and here again we can benefit from Kant’s transcendental philosophy. According to Kant there are two types of concepts: ideas whose function is regulative, viz. to integrate our experience into a totality, and categories whose function is constitutive, viz. to differentiate the various kinds of our experience; with reference to the universe he speaks of cosmological ideas in the plural, but probably he refers to different aspects of the same. Now I do not want to let my own position depend on the right interpretation of Kant; however, I believe that I speak in accordance with the general tenor of his thinking when I propose the following critical idea of the universe, in contradistinction to the copious ideas of meagre value implied by the traditional profusion of pretentious metaphysical ontology.

The critical idea of the universe which I here intend to advocate is distinguished from all ontological ideas of the same by the fact that it presents the universe as an unknown X, an unique, absolute and ultimate referent („thing-in-itself“) devoid of any specifiable properties. It serves the purpose of providing a minimum foundation for the stand of scientific realism, and in this way it seems correlative to truth conceived as a regulative idea in the sense of Popper. If a theory is to be true it must be true of an object which it represents and to which it refers, but as theories may be falsified, and never verified, we shall never be able to recognize truth; so it would be rash to hypostasize an ontology by ascribing definite properties to the universe. In the following I shall write Universe whenever I refer to some metaphysical idea, whereas I shall write universe in order to denote the idea of a totality devoid of intrinsic properties. With this convention I follow the proposal of Harrison (1981), the only difference being that he restricts the spelling with a capital U to the singular, saving the spelling without capitals for the plural, whereas I allow both spellings to be used both in the singular and in the plural.

My reason for this divergence is twofold: (1) The Universe of a metaphysical praxis needs no name as long as it is not deliberately conceptualized into some metaphysical theory. Now, although the proponent of a metaphysical theory will inevitably tend to believe that his Universe (capital U, singular) is the only true one, history knows innumerable examples of other Universes (capital U, plural) which are not merely different, but outright incompatible. So the plural is needed too. (2) Although it is reasonable to identify different world-models with different kinds of universes (no capitals, plural), we shall nevertheless refer to a unique instance whenever a specific model is falsified by confrontation with experience and we want to make clear that this model does not properly represent the universe (no capitals, singular), and it is precisely to this purpose that the critical idea of an empty referent, an X, is needed. The advantage of the present approach is that we can retain a critical realism although we are incessantly reminded that our best ideas and theories may turn out to be false.

(Zitatende)

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Beste Grüße Ekkehard Friebe